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ABSTRACT
With the increased popularity of smart phones, there is a
greater need to have a robust authentication mechanism
that handles various security threats and privacy leakages
effectively. This paper studies continuous authentication for
touch interface based mobile devices. A Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) based behavioral template training approach
is presented, which does not require training data from other
subjects other than the owner of the mobile device and can
get updated with new data over time. The gesture patterns
of the user are modeled from multiple sensors - touch, ac-
celerometer and gyroscope data using a continuous left-right
HMM. The approach models the tap and stroke patterns of
a user since these are the basic and most frequently used in-
teractions on a mobile device. To evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed method a new data set has been created
from 42 users who interacted with off-the-shelf applications
on their smart phones. Results show that the performance
of the proposed approach is promising and potentially better
than other state-of-the-art approaches.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional access control mechanisms used in most smart
phone systems today, like password or lock pattern, are vul-
nerable to various attacks, including password guessing and
eavesdropping ([14, 6]).
In search of an enhanced secure authentication mechanism,
various works explored graphical passwords [8, 7, 2, 28, 3, 9].
Due to the growing popularity of touch-interfaces, research
started exploring authentication methods that exploit touch
patterns [21, 26]. Sae-Bae et. al showed that users can
be authenticated from their multi-touch interaction through
extraction of touch characteristics [22, 23]. However, both
graphical and multi-touch gestures have only been proposed
at the login stage and therefore do not provide protection
against unauthorized access after that stage.
Continuous authentication has been suggested as a method
of providing persistent protection to the users [1, 16]. Here,
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instead of authenticating a user at the time of login, the
system continuously monitors aspects of the user behavior
biometrics, like keystroke dynamics [24], speaking pattern
[29], device use patterns [15] and touch pattern [25, 10, 11,
4, 5] in order to maintain authentication after login.
Touch behavior biometrics provide a promising direction for
continuously monitoring the user input on mobile devices.
The existing approaches [25, 10, 11, 4] typically employed a
binary classifier trained with the touch data from both the
legitimate user as well as multiple other users. Reported re-
sults demonstrated that such classifiers detected the authen-
tic user with high probability. However, in real-life, training
a system with data from other users is not feasible.
This paper presents a Continuous HMM based Authenti-
cation System (CHAS) on touch devices. While a basic
HMM-based algorithm has been developed before in [18],
that method worked only on horizontal and vertical slide
data [11] captured from mobile devices in constrained sit-
uation. The method has been extended here to perform
recognition on general touch-pad input gestures, such as tap,
up-down or forward-backward slide. In addition, it provides
a method for combining data from multiple sensors, like ac-
celerometer and gyroscope, to achieve a higher probability
of detection, without interfering with the usage model of the
device. The method offers the possibility of being trained
using only the authentic user’s data and can be updated
with new data over a period of time as needed.
The proposed CHAS framework performance is demonstrated
on a newly acquired data set that allows general touch-pad
input by the user in a real-world scenario. In-depth analysis
of the proposed method using this data set shows improved
authentication accuracy can be achieved when multi-sensor
data is combined with touch information.
The key contributions of this paper are thus two-fold. First,
the paper introduces CHAS, an improved method for HMM-
based continuous authentication, that works based on multi-
sensor touch information. Second, the work includes a new
data set that features multi-sensor data from 42 users. Un-
like the previous data set that was used to test continuous
mobile authentication, ([11]) which had only limited ges-
tures (i.e., horizontal or vertical slides) created in controlled
manner, the new data set captures data in unconstrained
situations. This study includes extensive evaluation of the
newly proposed framework on this data set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the survey to examine the need for continuous au-
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thentication on mobile phones. The CHAS framework is
introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 the extensive experi-
mental results are discussed and Section 5 includes the con-
clusions for the work.
2. EXPLORATORY STUDY
Previous work was developed based on the assumption that
continuous authentication would be beneficial for the users
and that users are worried about the data on their phone.
However, no user study that the authors are aware of has
been done to support this idea. In this section we present a
first attempt to examine the need for continuous authenti-
cation by means of two user surveys. The surveys show that
participants are concerned about the data stored on their
phone and that existing locking mechanisms are not robust
enough as most of the participants observed someone else’s
pin in the past. Therefore, the surveys demonstrate the need
for the development of alternatives to pin-based or pattern
based locking mechanisms.
This work includes two surveys. The first was filled by the
47 participants at a northeastern University [20]. The sec-
ond was conducted online and included 267 participants [27].
Both studies were designed to look at the mobile usage and
locking patterns of the participants.
The studies showed that most participants lock their phones
(87% of the participants in the first study and 82% of the
participants in the second study). However, participants in
the first study were asked if they have an application that
protects their apps/pictures/media files. Only 15% of the
participants indicated that is the case. Most participants
in this study were worried someone would access their data
in their absence (55%). Similarly, most participants in the
second study said they had data they would like to hide
(71%).
In addition, in the second study, participants were asked
if they ever observed the pin of another user. 73% of the
participated did observe in the past the pin of a friend or
family member, and even a higher percentage (79%) knew
the current pin of someone else, a finding that raises a con-
cern about the safety of current locking mechanisms.
The overall results can be viewed in Table 1. Since most
participants stated they have data they deem as private on
the phone, these studies reveal the need to further continue
looking for alternative methods for mobile authentication.
Study 1 Study 2
No Participants 47 267
Lock the phone 87% 82%
Use Pin or Pattern Lock 87% 81%
Worried about Data Privacy 55% 71%
Observed someone else’s pin — 73%
Table 1: Survey results - Mobile User Security. Most users
are using a lock mechanism and are worried about their data
privacy. Most of the participants in the second study also
observed someone else’s pin in the past.
3. PROPOSEDHMMBASEDCONTINUOUS
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
In this work, we assume that a malicious attacker has gained
access to a person’s mobile phone. The device is either un-
protected (e.g., no PIN) or the attacker somehow knows the
authentication secret, for instance by shoulder surfing the
owner. The attacker can then perform undesirable actions
with the device violating the owner’s privacy in his absence
or without his knowledge. The objective of the current work
is to handle such situations and make this kind of manipu-
lation impossible by analyzing touch behavior biometric of
the user. To this end we introduce a new Continuous HMM
based Authentication System (CHAS) described in the next
section.
3.1 Data Sources
Usage of multiple sensors, including audio sensor, light sen-
sor, accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer have been
used to provide secure access control [12, 13] in mobile phones.
Current work relies on touch, accelerometer, and gyroscope
data to create a behavior biometric model of the user for
authentication purposes.
A touch-screen based smart phone is typically operated through
touch commands such as tap, slide, pinch, and free stroke
handwriting. However, pinch, a two-finger gesture to do
zooming, is used less than 5% of the time used by the overall
gestures [4]. Similarly, though handwriting is an alternative
input method to enter characters, it is not used very often.
Tap and slide are the basic and most frequently used ges-
tures. They are utilized to perform almost all of the actions
on the smart phone, such as typing using soft keyboard, un-
locking screen with PIN and navigating documents. There-
fore, in the current work, we develop a user behavior model
based on these two popular gestures.
In practice, touch gesture consists of a series of raw data
input forming a touch data sequence. For each gesture per-
formed on the touch-screen of the mobile device, we capture
six raw features - time stamp, vibration, rotation, pressure,
size of touch, and position. A pre-processing step is per-
formed to normalize the sampling rate of the data sequences,
using linear interpolation to derive a re-sampled signal with
a uniform rate.
3.2 Architecture of CHAS
To design an effective touch data based user authentication
approach, two key issues need to be addressed: 1) how to
model the user behavior from the touch data, 2) how to rec-
ognize users according to this model. Figure 1 outlines the
framework of the proposed CHAS system. Centric to this
approach is HMM based pattern recognition algorithm that
identifies the legitimate user from touch data. As HMM was
found to be better than the exiting approaches in modeling
user touch behavior [18], while employing only the owner’s
touch information, it is chosen as the basic classifier. How-
ever, unlike the algorithm proposed in [18], in which a dif-
ferent HMM system was needed for each type of movement,
one architecture is created for different types of gestures in
the newly proposed CHAS framework.
The proposed CHAS framework works in two steps: training
and authentication. During training, a behavioral model is
created based on the touch behavior (pressure, area, dura-
tion, position, vibration and rotation) of the user. At the
time of authentication, the test observations are compared
with the stored behavioral model to establish the identity of
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Figure 1: Overview of CHAS framework
the user.
After getting all the training touch data, the behavioral
model is created based on the type of gesture. Touch-screen
can capture each user touch event and generate correspond-
ing touch data sequence. This touch data sequence is con-
sidered directly as the basic input for modeling the user be-
havior. However, different sequences corresponding to differ-
ent types of touch gestures contain different spatio-temporal
characteristics. To address this issue, the proposed approach
considers each type of touch gestures separately and mod-
els them with their corresponding sequences of raw data.
Since two primary gestures are considered here, i.e. tap and
slide, two classifiers are developed. Unlike [18], where sep-
arate HMM models have been used to represent slides of
different directions (horizontal and vertical), here one sin-
gle model has been employed to represent all types of slide
gestures. To achieve this, the slide gestures are normalized
to make them rotation-invariant. Each classifier consists of
three HMMs depending on the data source. First one is
based on only touch information, i.e., coordinate, pressure,
area and time stamp. The other two are corresponding to
vibration and rotation data obtained from the sensors.
During deployment, given a user model and some recently
observed behavior, the likelihood that the device is in the
hands of the legitimate user is computed. For both the slide
and tap classifier, the likelihood score obtained from the
three HMMs are averaged to get a combined similarity score.
This value is used as an authentication score. It may happen
that the data from all the sensors is not available or usable at
a certain time. Any continuous user identification approach
using multiple sensors should take care of such a situation.
The proposed system is flexible enough to handle subset of
sensors data. It can still work efficiently and give robust
performance.
To increase the robustness of the authentication method,
multiple consecutive gestures are used for the final decision.
The mean of all the combined similarity scores is employed
for this purpose. The score is used to make an authentication
decision: typically, a threshold is used to decide whether to
accept or reject the user. The threshold can vary depending
on whether the application is security sensitive. If the input
is detected to be of a legitimate user, he can continue us-
ing the device without any interruption. Otherwise, access
control, like entering the text or pattern based password, is
invoked.
3.3 HMM based Behavior Model
Here the basic HMM, which is used to model the touch be-
havior of a subject as well as other sensor data input is
described. HMM is considered for modeling the touch ges-
ture behavior of a subject since it captures the local dy-
namic characteristics as well as the shape and length of a
gesture. The left-right topology is chosen with no state skip
allowed. The observable output is the trajectory information
of the gestures. The states represent the transitive proper-
ties of the consecutive coordinates of the gesture and the
state sequence that maximizes the probability of observing
the training gestures becomes the corresponding model of a
subject.
For each gesture trajectory, an M-mixture left-to-right HMM
is fitted using the Baum-Welch algorithm [17]. The optimum
number of states and mixtures of an HMM varies with the
complexity and length of gestures in the training sequences.
Five-fold cross validation principle is used to estimate the
optimal number of states and the associated HMM parame-
ters.
Once the behavioral models for all subject classes have been
created through HMMs, authentication of the subjects is
performed by computing the log-likelihood of the input ges-
tures using Viterbi algorithm [17]. Along with the tradi-
tional log-likelihood value, an additional measure named
as gesture kinematics is computed that represents the per-
centage of time spent in each state. Next, the similarity
scores are derived from the log-likelihood value and the ges-
ture kinematics. These two scores are combined to get the
combined similarity score for authentication. Details of the
HMM based behavior model can be found in [18].
4. EXPERIMENTALRESULTSANDDISCUS-
SION
This section describes the performance of the proposed CHAS
framework. The authentication system is evaluated through
calculation of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Re-
jection Rate (FRR). Since these two error rates are inversely
related (lower FAR increases the system security while lower
FRR increases its usability) Equal Error Rate (EER) is also
measured, where the FAR is equal to the FRR value.
Detail evaluation has been performed to test how the CHAS
framework works with different types of gestures in two pos-
sible situations: when only touch information is used and
when both touch as well as sensor data are available. Ex-
periments have been performed to test the performance of
the proposed system with increasing number of consequen-
tial gestures.
4.1 Data Set Description
To evaluate the CHAS framework in challenging real-life sce-
narios, a new data set has been created that mimicked regu-
3
Figure 2: Equal error rate variation as a function of the number of gestures using touch-pad input
lar usage of mobile devices. The users were asked to perform
activities using off-the-shelf online tools, such as reading a
Wikipedia page and filling Qualtrix questionnaires. This
is in contrast to the data set used in [11, 18], in which a
custom-application was created that enabled capturing spe-
cific horizontal and vertical movements by the user. The
participants were asked to do a specific set of tasks using
their smart phone. They were told the goal of the study is
rating the different tasks. Those tasks included, controlling
a smart phone UI using slide touch gesture (vertical and hor-
izontal slide), mobile web browsing using pinch and spread
touch gestures, entering sentences using virtual touch key-
board, selecting radio buttons by tap gesture, etc. Each task
was repeated multiple times by the same user.
Data was collected from 42 users among which 75% of the
participants were men, 78% of the participants belonged to
the 18-24 years age group, 15% to the 25-30 years group and
7% to the 30-35 years group. During data collection, users
were asked to open their mailbox and read an e-mail which
had detailed instructions about the sequence of tasks to be
performed. Afterwards, users had to open the links which
pointed to the following five tasks.
• A Wikipedia page of Niagara Falls
• Questionnaire based on Niagara Falls Wikipedia page
• A Wikipedia page of NYU Poly.
• Questionnaire based on NYU Poly Wikipedia page.
• A final survey questionnaire
Every user was asked to read through each web page and
then click on a link to go to the next task. During the
process, data of all types of touch events were recorded. The
data includes the coordinates of touch, the pressure applied,
the size of touch, and the values of the accelerometer and
gyroscope sensors along with the time stamps.
The data was collected using Nexus 4 multi-touch phone
with Quad-core 1.5Ghz processor, and screen resolution 768×
1280. The data capture application was developed on the
Android platform 4.4.
4.2 Authentication with Touch Data
The performance of the CHAS framework has been evalu-
ated from the two most frequently used gestures on mobile
phone - tap and slide. In this section, we describe the au-
thentication results using only touch information. The touch
data obtained from the first two tasks described in Section
4.1 was used to train the classifiers and the data from the
following three tasks was used for testing.
EER Performance: Figure 2 presents the EER perfor-
mance of the CHAS framework. Since the number of con-
secutive gestures required to get the final classification result
reflects the time requirement of the whole system, EER vari-
ation with the number of observations has been plotted here.
On each box, the heavy red horizontal bar is the median, the
edges of the box are the first and third quartile, the whiskers
extend to the most extreme data points not considered out-
liers, and the outliers are plotted individually.
Figure 2(a) shows that the median EER of authentication
using one observation of slide is 13.29%. The EER de-
creases to 0% after observing 19 consecutive slide gestures.
Similarly, for tap gesture, the median EER is found to be
16.55% using one observation. After 17 consecutive taps the
EER saturates to near 1% (see Figure 2(b)). Since slide
gesture is comparatively longer than tap, more data points
are recorded for slide. The increased number of data points
made the slide gesture more distinguishable than tap. Thus,
the authentication performance based on slide model is bet-
ter than the tap.
Next, we evaluate the performance of CHAS framework in
a more general scenario where the action sequences are ran-
dom combination of any types of gestures. Experimental
results show that the median EER is 15.10% with one ob-
servation (see Figure 2(c)). However, after 21 observations
it is reduced to 0%. Thus, it may be noted that when a com-
bination of slide and tap gestures is used, the EER becomes
worse than using slide gesture alone while better than only
tap gesture.
FAR and FRR Performance: We also look at the secu-
rity and usability of the proposed approach in terms of FAR
4
Figure 3: Equal error rate variation as a function of the number of gestures using multi-sensor information
and FRR. In applications where security is not so much of
importance (like games), low FRR is desired. Figure 4 de-
picts the median FAR performance of the system. When
the FRR of the CHAS framework is zero, the median FAR
of the authentication is near 0% after observing 15 taps and
17 slide gestures.
For applications with high security requirement (like bank-
ing), FRR performance of the CHAS framework is also eval-
uated while the FAR is set to zero (see Figure 5). It can be
observed that the FRR reaches 0% after 19 consecutive taps
and 17 consecutive slide gestures.
Using combined gesture data, both the FAR and FRR come
down to 0% after 17 gesture observations. These results in-
dicate inherent strength of the HMM based behavior model
in varied usage scenarios.
Figure 4: False acceptance rate variation as a function of
the number of gestures using touch-pad input
4.3 Authentication with Multiple Sensor Data
In this section, we evaluate the CHAS framework using
touch as well as two other sensors data. Similar to the for-
mer case, here also training is done based on the touch, ac-
celerometer and gyroscope data obtained from the first two
tasks and the rest of the data is used for testing.
EER Performance: First, we show how the system works
with either tap or slide gesture (similarly to the previous
Figure 5: False rejection rate variation as a function of the
number of gestures using touch-pad input
evaluation). Then, the system performance with general
gesture data set that features any combination of these two
gestures is reported.
Figure 3 presents the EER performance of the two gestures
with increasing number of observations. It can be seen that
the median EER using one observation of tap is 12.85% and
one slide is 10.92%. After observing about 19 consecutive
taps and 17 consecutive slide gestures, the EER is reduced
to 0%. However, while using combined gestures, the EER is
found to be 11.25%. It decreases to 0% after 17 consecutive
gestures. Therefore, it may be noted that inclusion of the
multi-sensor data helps to improve the performance, result-
ing in lower EER compared to using only the touch data for
the same number of consecutive gestures.
These results are comparable to the results achieved using
only vertical or horizontal slide data [18, 11], where 11 con-
secutive strokes were needed to achieve near 0% EER. Thus,
with a small increase in the number of required gestures,
CHAS framework achieves similar accuracy while handling
almost every possible gesture performed on a mobile de-
vice in unconstrained manner. Moreover, since this result is
achieved with a combination of gestures where tap generally
requires less time than slide gesture, overall time require-
ment to get the verification result of the CHAS framework
is close to [18].
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Figure 6: False acceptance rate variation as a function of
the number of gestures using multi-sensor information
Figure 7: False rejection rate variation as a function of the
number of gestures using multi-sensor information
FAR and FRR Performance: Figure 6 presents the FAR
performance of the system. The results show that the me-
dian FAR reaches 0% after observing about 15 consecutive
taps and 13 consecutive slide gestures. Similarly, the me-
dian FRR decreases to 0% with 13 consecutive taps or slide
gestures (see Figure 7). Using combined gesture, the FAR
decreases to 0% after 11 consecutive observations, while the
FRR decreases to the same level with 13 gestures. Thus,
the FAR and FRR performance of CHAS framework also
improved after including multi-sensor data with touch in-
formation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This work presents a survey that points out the need for en-
hanced security mechanism beyond the point of traditional
login. This observation motivated us to design CHAS frame-
work that models user touch behavior using HMM. The au-
thentication method is based on multi-sensor data recorded
from the owner’s touch interactions on his mobile device.
Extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on a newly
acquired database, which features real-life mobile usage sce-
nario, has been carried out.
The first part of the work demonstrates that it is possible
to authenticate users with reasonable accuracy using only
the touch data of the owner. The benefits of using only the
device owner’s data are twofold. First, in case of personal
devices, data from other users may not be available. Thus,
training the classifier with other users’ data is not possible.
Second, authentication results using only the owner’s data
for training reflect the real-life situation in a better way.
Next, the work continues by integrating additional data from
accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. The users were not
restricted to do any specific gestures on the phone but were
allowed to perform different activities freely. Testing on the
new acquired data set shows that the proposed framework
achieves robust authentication result, with 0% ERR using
17 consecutive observations.
The results suggest that the CHAS framework is applicable
in a variety of situations, both using only touch data as well
as multi-sensor data, to execute continuous authentication
based on natural touch interactions. Future work involves
automatic update of the CHAS framework with new data
over time without the need of retraining.
Acknowledgment
This material is based in part upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1228842. We
would like to thank T.V. Nguyen for sharing some results of
his mobile security survey with us.
6. REFERENCES
[1] Y. Aksari and H. Artuner. Active authentication by
mouse movements. Proc. of IEEE 24th Intl’
Symposium on Computer and Information Sciences
(ISCIS), 2009.
[2] S. Akula and V. Devisetty. Image based registration
and authentication system. Midwest Instruction and
Computing Symposium, 4, 2004.
[3] J. Birget, D. Hong, and N. Memon. Graphical
passwords based on robust discretization. IEEE Trans.
on Information Forensics and Security, 1(3):395–399,
2006.
[4] C. Bo, L. Zhang, and X. Li. Silentsense: Silent user
identification via dynamics of touch and movement
behavioral biometrics. Proc. of MobiCom, 2013.
[5] A. Chan, T. Halevi, and N. Memon. Touchpad input
for continuous biometric authentication.
Communications and Multimedia Security, Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, pages 86–91, 2014.
[6] DataGenetics. Pin analysis.
“http://www.datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/”,
April 2015.
[7] D. Davis, F. Monrose, and M. Reiter. On user choice
in graphical password schemes. Proc. of 13th Usenix
Security Symposium, 13:1–14, 2004.
[8] R. Dhamija and A. Perrig. Deja vu: User study using
images for authentication. Proc. of 9th Usenix Security
Symposium, pages 14–17, 2000.
[9] A. Dirik, N. Memon, and J. Birget. Modeling user
choice in the passpoints graphical password scheme.
Proc. of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and
security (SOUPS), pages 20–28, 2007.
[10] T. Feng, Z. Liu, K.-A. Kwon, W. Shi, B. Carbunar,
Y. Jiang, and N. Nguyen. Continuous mobile
authentication using touchscreen gestures. Proc. of
IEEE Conf. Homeland Security (HST), pages
451–456, 2012.
[11] M. Frank, R. Biedert, E. Ma, I. Martinovic, and
D. Son. Touchalytics: On the applicability of
touchscreen input as a behavioral biometric for
continuous authentication. IEEE Trans. on
Information Forensics and Security, 8(1):136–148,
June 2013.
6
[12] T. Halevi, S. Lin, D. Ma, A. Prasad, N. Saxena,
J. Voris, and T. Xiang. Sensing-enabled defenses to
rfid unauthorized reading and relay attacks without
changing the usage model. Proc. of PerCom, pages
227–234, 2012.
[13] T. Halevi, D. Ma, N. Saxena, and T. Xiang. Secure
proximity detection for nfc devices based on ambient
sensor data. Proc. of ESORICS, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 379–396, 2012.
[14] H. Jo, M. Karsai, J. Kerte‘sz, and K. Kaski. Circadian
patterns and burstiness in mobile phone
communication. New Journal of Physics, 14, 2012.
[15] F. Li, N. Clarke, M. Papadaki, and P. Dowland.
Active authentication for mobile devices utilising
behaviour profiling. Intl’ Journal of Information
Security, pages 1–16, 2013.
[16] K. Niinuma, U. Park, and A. Jain. Soft biometric
traits for continuous user authentication. IEEE Trans.
on Information Forensics and Security, 5(4):771–78,
2012.
[17] L. Rabiner and B. Juang. Fundamentals of speech
recognition. Prentice Hall Signal Processing Series,
1993.
[18] A. Roy, T. Halevi, and N. Memon. An hmm-based
behavior modeling approach for continuous mobile
authentication. In Proc. of IEEE Intl’ Conf. on
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
pages 3789–3793. IEEE, 2014.
[19] A. Roy, T. Halevi, and N. Memon. An hmm-based
multi-sensor approach for continuous mobile
authentication. In Military Communications
Conference, MILCOM 2015-2015 IEEE, pages
1311–1316. IEEE, 2015.
[20] A. Roy, N. Memon, and T. Halevi. Movile active
authentication survey. “http://bit.ly/1cSjYHF”, 2014.
[21] N. Sae-Bae and N. Memon. A simple and effective
method for online signature verification. Proc. of Intl’
Conf. of Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG),
pages 1–12, 2013.
[22] N. Sae-Bae, N. Memon, and K. Isbister. Investigating
multi-touch gestures as a novel biometric modality.
Proc. of IEEE Fifth Intl’ Conf. on Biometrics:
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS),
14:156–161, 2012.
[23] N. Sae-Bae, N. Memon, and K.Isbister. Biometric-rich
gestures: A novel approach to authentication on
multi-touch devices. Proc. of ACM Annual Conf. on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), pages
977–986, 2012.
[24] A. Serwadda, Z. Wang, P. Koch, S. Govindarajan, and
R. P. et al. Scan-based evaluation of continuous
keystroke authentication systems. IT Professional,
15(4):20–23, 2013.
[25] W. Shi, J. Yang, Y. Jiang, F. Yang, and Y. Xiong.
Senguard: Passive user identification on smartphones
using multiple sensors. Proc. of IEEE 7th Intl’ Conf.
on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and
Communications(WiMob), pages 141–148, 2011.
[26] T. Van Nguyen, N. Sae-Bae, and N. Memon.
Finger-drawn pin authentication on touch devices. In
Image Processing (ICIP), 2014 IEEE International
Conference on, pages 5002–5006. IEEE, 2014.
[27] T. Van Nguyen, N. Sae-Bae, and N. Memon.
Draw-a-pin: Authentication using finger-drawn pin on
touch devices. Computers & Security, 66:115–128,
2017.
[28] D. Weinshall and S. Kirkpatrick. Passwords you’ll
never forget, but can’t recall. Proc. of ACM Annual
Conf. on Human Factors in Computing Systems(CHI),
pages 1399–1402, 2004.
[29] R. Woo, A. Park, and T. Hazen. The mit mobile
device speaker verification corpus: data collection and
preliminary experiments. Proc. of IEEE 7th Intl’
Conf. on The Speaker and Language Recognition
Workshop, pages 1–6, 2006.
7
